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INTEGRATING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING INTO THE
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ANNIE PETSONK*
SUMMARY
This article explores the relationship between the newly emerg-
ing market for tradable greenhouse gas emissions allowances estab-
lished by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the rule-
based frameworks of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The
paper finds that the greenhouse gas emissions reduction responsibili-
ties and emissions trading rights established by the Kyoto Protocol do
not conflict in any way with the responsibilities and rights of the na-
tions under the WTO Agreements governing trade in goods, services,
and the provision of subsidies.  Rather, the emissions trading struc-
ture of the Kyoto Protocol deploys a rule-based system of “free
trade” in emissions allowances to benefit the environment in a man-
ner that is fully compatible with the WTO system.
The article cautions, however, that if governments implement
their Kyoto Protocol obligations by placing quantitative restrictions
on trade in allowances, or arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminating
against certain nations engaged in emissions trading, such measures
might raise WTO issues at the same time that they would diminish the
environmental effectiveness of the protocol.
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30-May 1, 1999).
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The article recommends that in designing rules for the Kyoto
Protocol’s multilateral emissions trading system and structuring na-
tional implementation of Protocol obligations, governments can
maximize environmental and economic benefits if they refrain from
raising non-tariff barriers to trade in emission allowances, and avoid
imposing quantitative restrictions on, or arbitrarily discriminating
against, such trade.
The article concludes that by following these recommendations,
governments enhance the potential for the Kyoto Protocol to achieve
real, significant, and cost-effective reductions in emissions of global
warming gasses, while reducing the likelihood that their implementa-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions reduction measures would raise any
inconsistency with their responsibilities under the multilateral trading
system.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
A. Responsibilities and Rights of Nations Under The Kyoto Protocol
on Climate Change
Experience with market-based approaches to environmental pro-
tection at local, regional, and national levels has demonstrated that
such programs, if properly designed, can achieve improved environ-
mental results faster, and at less cost, than “command-and-control”
approaches, technology mandates, operational performance stan-
dards, or taxes.1  International experience with these instruments in-
cludes their use in fisheries management and in a limited number of
international emissions allowance transactions.  The 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol on Climate Change2 has the potential to create the first truly
global demonstration of the power of environmental markets to de-
liver improved environmental results by providing incentives for
countries, companies, and communities to reduce emissions of the
greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change.  Because it
offers this potential, in a market-based “trading” framework that has
the potential to integrate smoothly into the existing international
framework of trade in goods and services, the Protocol is attracting
attention and interest at local, national, regional, and global levels.
This article examines the relationship between the emissions trading
systems established by the Kyoto Protocol and the trade rules estab-
lished by the World Trade Organization (WTO).3
1. See ANNIE PETSONK ET AL., MARKET MECHANISMS & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 10-15 (1998), available at <http://www.pewclimate.org/
projects/pol_market.html>.
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (not yet in force) (84 signatories and
22 Parties as of Jan. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at <http://www.unfccc.de/
resource/docs/cop3/l07a01.htm>.
3. The article’s scope is limited to the relationship between the WTO and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol trading systems.  There are a number of other issues related to the interface between the
WTO system and policies and measures that nations might use to implement their Protocol ob-
ligations.  For a recommendation that a nation’s minimum fuel economy standards for cars or
energy efficiency standards for appliances be designed so as not to place any de facto differential
and adverse impacts on imports, see Richard W. Parker, Design for Domestic Carbon Emissions
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Beginning in 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) issued a series of reports indicating that carbon di-
oxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), which are be-
ing emitted into the atmosphere in ever greater amounts due to hu-
man activities, have the potential to cause serious climate disruption.4
In Earth’s atmosphere, GHGs trap heat that would otherwise radiate
into space.  Unchecked, anthropogenic emission of GHGs is expected
to contribute to an accelerated warming of the planet, with poten-
tially dangerous interference in the world’s climate system.5
The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change6 (UNFCCC, or the Climate Treaty) commits its more than
167 Parties to the objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference in the climate system.7  While the Climate
Treaty establishes no legally binding limit on GHG emissions, the
1997 Kyoto Protocol to that treaty establishes cumulative (five-year),
legally-binding caps on the anthropogenic emissions of GHGs by
some thirty-nine industrialized nations, with the caps to take effect
for the years 2008-2012.8  The nations and their allowable amounts of
emissions are listed in Annex B of the Protocol, and these nations are
often referred to as “Annex B” nations.  The Kyoto Protocol places
responsibilities on Annex B nations to report on their greenhouse gas
emissions annually, and to limit their greenhouse gas emissions to the
levels established in Annex B.9
These responsibilities are quite substantial.  Never before have
the industrialized nations of the world collectively committed to limit
emissions of such a broad range of gases so closely linked with such a
Trading: Comments on WTO Aspects—Summary Memorandum 2 (June 22, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) available at <http://www.heinzctr.org/publications/ index.htm>.
4. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1996).
5. See Letter from Dr. Harold Mooney et al. to President Clinton (May 21, 1997) (on file
with author).
6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
(entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) (181 Parties as of Dec. 10, 1999) [hereinafter UNFCCC],
available at <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/index.html>.
7. See id. at art. 2.
8. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3 & Annex B.
9. See id. at arts. 3, 5, 7, & Annex B.  Note that the Protocol makes reference to parties
“included in Annex I” as having the reduction commitments set forth in Annex B.  This refer-
ence is to Annex I of the UNFCCC, supra note 6, where a list of 41 nations participating in the
larger Convention is recorded.  The nations listed in Annex B of the Protocol differ from those
listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC only in that Turkey and Belarus were not named in the for-
mer as having been assigned emissions caps.
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broad range of economic activity.  Energy production and consump-
tion, transportation, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, for-
estry—each of these sectors is associated, to varying degrees, with the
emission of GHGs.  Implementing the Protocol’s obligations may
trigger significant changes in the way human societies engage in these
activities.
While the Kyoto Protocol imposes these responsibilities, it also
establishes a set of prerogatives or, in the parlance of economists,
“transactable rights.”10  The Protocol allocates to each Annex B na-
tion “assigned amount units” (AAUs) of GHG emissions equal to
that nation’s allowable GHG emissions under its legally binding cap.11
The Protocol then affords Annex B nations the unfettered right to
trade or transact these AAUs.12  The Protocol also accords two or
more Annex B nations that undertake joint cooperative projects—
projects that reduce emissions from the territory of one of the
nations—the right to transact the “emissions reduction units” (ERUs)
that result from those projects.13  Furthermore, the Protocol confers
upon nations that are not members of Annex B the right to receive
certified emissions reduction units (CERs) for projects in their
territories that reduce emissions below what would have occurred in
the absence of the projects.  The Protocol specifies that these CERs
are also fully transactable and accords Annex B nations the right to
use such CERs in meeting the Annex B nations’ emissions targets.14
Accounting provisions in the Protocol specify that Annex B Par-
ties that transfer AAUs and ERUs to other Parties must subtract the
units from their total assigned amounts; Annex B Parties that receive
10. Economists typically refer to these allowances as “rights” in order to convey the sense
that, ab initio, the prerogative to emit a specified amount of GHGs rests with the nation holding
the entitlements.  This approach contrasts with a system in which those affected adversely by
climate change might hold the “right” to be free of such impacts. See Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677, 768-
69, 770 n.337 (1999).  In principle, the Kyoto Protocol could have adopted such an approach, but
it did not.  Lawyers, by contrast, typically refer to the prerogatives established by the Kyoto
Protocol as “allowances” because they are not immutable; they may be diminished, for example,
by operation of rules concerning allocation of responsibilities for failure to comply with emis-
sions limitation obligations.
11. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3 & Annex B.
12. See id. at art. 17.
13. Id. at art. 6.
14. See id. at art. 12 (Clean Development Mechanism/CERs).  Article 12.10 provides that
“[CERs] obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the beginning of the first com-
mitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment period.”
Id. at art. 12.10.  The Protocol does not specify whether these CERs may be banked for use in
the second commitment period.
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AAUs, ERUs, and CERs may add these to their total assigned
amounts.15  Detailed rules that may affect the fungibility of these units
are slated to be elaborated and adopted by the Conference of the Par-
ties at their sixth session, to be held in the Hague, November 13-24,
2000.
An additional article in the Kyoto Protocol affords Parties the
right to form so-called “bubble” or “umbrella” groups, in which the
collectivity adopts a joint commitment to limit GHG emissions, and
some Parties agree to re-allocate assigned amounts to others.16  In the
event the collectivity fails to meet its commitment, the Protocol holds
each member of the group responsible for meeting its commitment
under the re-allocation agreement.17  The fifteen member states of the
European Union (EU) have indicated that they plan to fulfill their
Protocol commitments through this type of re-allocation of Protocol
responsibilities.18
Interest in the market mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol in-
creased sharply following the fourth UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties, held in November 1998, in Buenos Aires, Argentina.  One
factor contributing to the increased interest is the growing awareness
among nations that emissions trading can play a critical role in
achieving emissions reductions at lower cost by providing incentives
for competitors to develop innovative, cost-effective emissions reduc-
tion technologies and processes.19  Another factor is the announce-
ment by non-Annex B nations, such as Argentina, that they plan to
adopt commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions and that they
are interested in participating in emissions trading.20  Other non-
Annex B nations also have a growing interest in the potential of emis-
sions trading to provide a new source of capital for cleaner, more en-
vironmentally sustainable development.  A third factor is the interest
of a number of countries in the development of domestic programs
15. See id. at arts. 3.10-3.12.
16. See id. at art. 4.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., EURPEAN COMMISSION, GREEN PAPER ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
TRADING WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 (2000) available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/
environment/docum/0087_en.htm>.
19. See, e.g., Environmental Defense, Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: The
Market Is Moving! (last modified Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/factsheets/kyoto/c%
5Femtrading%2Dbonn.html> (profiling recent emissions trading transactions).
20. See, e.g., International Institute for Sustainable Development, Linkages: Topic Index of
the UNFCCC COP-5 High Level Segment: Voluntary Commitments (last modifed Nov. 13, 1999)
<http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/climate/cop5/topics/volcommitments.html>.
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that allocate transactable emissions credits to companies and commu-
nities that move early to reduce emissions.21  Given that the United
States’ involvement with the Protocol has been somewhat constrained
by a Senate Resolution expressing the sentiment that certain devel-
opments ought to take place before the U.S. should go forward under
the Protocol, the above-mentioned trends are very encouraging to-
wards meeting those Congressional concerns and spurring active U.S.
participation in the treaty’s implementation.22
B. Responsibilities and Rights of Nations Under the Multilateral
Agreements of the WTO
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade agreements,23 adopted
in 1994 under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
is the most comprehensive set of multilateral trade agreements in
terms of coverage and membership since the 1947 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).24  These agreements cover
the majority of the world’s trade in goods and services.  They estab-
lish a set of responsibilities that all Member states must observe, a set
of rights that all Member states enjoy, and a system of enforcement
that imposes highly automatic consequences on Members who, after
one or two rounds of adjudicatory proceedings, are found to have
acted in a manner inconsistent with their WTO obligations.
GATT 1947 established certain basic, well-known legal rights
that are enjoyed by all Members and legal obligations that are bind-
ing upon all Members.  These rights and obligations have been incor-
21. See, e.g., S. 547, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2520, 106th Cong. (1999) (authorizing the
President, under both versions, to enter into agreements to provide regulatory credit for volun-
tary early action to mitigate potential environmental impacts from greenhouse gas emissions).
22. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).  The Senate rsolution was adopted by a
vote of 95-0.  The operative clauses of the resolution provide:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that – (1) the United States should not be a
signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in De-
cember 1997, or thereafter, which would – (A) mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance
period, or (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . .
Id.
23. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995) (proceeding
the 26,000 pages of Marrakesh Agreements Establishing the World Trade Organization) [here-
inafter WTO Agreement], available at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm>.
24. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
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porated into the Uruguay Round Agreements.  The basic rights in-
clude non-discrimination, which is incorporated in the national treat-
ment and most-favored-nation status obligations discussed more fully
below.25  The basic obligations include the duty to refrain from im-
posing quantitative restrictions on trade, the duty to refrain from
raising tariffs beyond bound levels, and the obligations to maintain
transparent trade laws and regulations.26  Members may institute
measures that are inconsistent with these obligations, provided that
the measures meet the “exceptions” requirements: that they neither
operate as disguised barriers to trade, nor constitute arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, and that they be, inter alia, “necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health” or that they “relat[e] to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources” and provided that these meas-
ures are imposed equivalently upon the domestic market as upon
trading partners.27
There is a growing body of highly technical international law and
interpretation that has developed with the elaboration of the Uru-
guay Round Agreements and in the course of resolution of disputes
under GATT 1947 and the new Agreements.  However, the basic ob-
ligations of the multilateral trading system, in broad outline, remain
fairly straightforward:
• The National Treatment Obligation requires Member states to
treat products produced in other Member states no differently
than “like products” produced domestically—that is, not to
discriminate between products produced abroad and those
produced at home.28
• The Most-Favored-Nation Obligation requires each Member
state to accord the same treatment to like products produced
by all other Member states—that is, not to discriminate among
like products of different Member states.29
25. See id. at arts. I (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) & III (National Treatment
on Internal Taxation and Regulation).
26. See id. at arts. II (Schedule of Concessions), X (Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations), & XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions).
27. Id. at art. XX (Exceptions).
28. Id. at art. III.
29. See id. at art. I.
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• The Tariff Obligations require Member states to “bind” or fix
tariff levels, refrain from raising tariffs above bound levels, and
progressively reduce tariff levels.30
• The Transparency Obligations require Member states to regu-
larly publish their trade laws and regulations in a transparent
manner that is available to, and comprehensible by, all import-
ers and exporters, and to notify the Secretariat of the WTO
(which in turn will notify the Member states) of actions taken
inconsistent with these obligations.31
• The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions requires Member
states to refrain from imposing quotas, including bans, on im-
ports of products from other Member states, except in speci-
fied circumstances (such as when the imported product poses a
threat to public health or the environment in the importing
state).32
• A specified set of Exceptions allows Member states to under-
take actions inconsistent with these and other obligations for
certain reasons, including protection of domestic health and
environment, subject to the requirement that these actions not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between nations where
the same conditions prevail, nor constitute a disguised barrier
to trade.33
A separate set of GATT 1947 Articles and a Uruguay Round
Agreement prohibit the imposition of governmental subsidies except
in narrowly limited circumstances.  These Articles and the Agreement
define an “actionable subsidy” as (1) a non-de minimus “financial
contribution” that (2) confers a benefit on a “specific enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries.”34
The “rights” that correspondingly spring from this set of respon-
sibilities primarily concern the right of Member states to conduct
trade free of discrimination, and the right to enjoy a high degree of
transparency in their trading arrangements.  So, for example, the pro-
hibition on quantitative restrictions is, in many respects, a transpar-
ency rule: quotas are much less transparent to traders than are tariffs,
30. See id. at art. II.
31. See id. at art. X.
32. See id. at arts. XI, XII, XIX, & XX.
33. See id. at art. XX.
34. Id. at arts. XVI & Annex I, & art. XVI; see also Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, arts. 1, 2, & 3 [hereinafter Subsidy Agreement], at Annex 1A, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 23.
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since no exporter could know in advance whether his or her shipment
of a product to a quota country would be the shipment that would
bump up against the quota and thus have to be turned back from the
importing country’s borders, possibly at great expense to the ex-
porter.  Similarly, the obligations to publish trade laws and regula-
tions and to notify trading partners of trade restrictions promote
competition among importers to improve the transparency of their
trading regimes in order to attract trade.
II.  MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNFCCC AND THE WTO
The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the UNFCCC: arguably,
when they adopted the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the very large number of
nations that are Parties to both the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1994
WTO Agreements might be considered to have waived their WTO
rights with regard to any inconsistency between the WTO Agree-
ments and the later-in-time Kyoto Protocol.  Indeed, the UNFCCC
and the WTO Agreements both enjoy extremely broad membership
among nations (see Table 1).  Still, not all nations that are Members
of the WTO are Parties to the UNFCCC.  Those WTO Members that
are not Parties to the UNFCCC could not be said to have waived
their WTO rights with regard to any inconsistencies between the two.
It may be argued that where Parties to one international agree-
ment subsequently adopt a second international agreement that is in-
consistent with the first, the Parties waived rights afforded to them
under the first.  In the 1990 GATT Panel Report Mexico v. United
States, also known as the Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report or Tuna-
Dolphin I, a GATT dispute resolution panel raised the possibility that
trade measures in certain multilateral environmental agreements
might be inconsistent with the obligations of GATT Contracting Par-
ties under the 1947 GATT.35
The Tuna-Dolphin Panel Report also hinted that in the event a
group of nations adopts a multilateral environmental agreement that
imposes trade measures against non-Parties to that agreement, then
any GATT Contracting Party/WTO Member State that is a non-Party
to the environmental agreement, but whose GATT rights are
abridged by the environmental agreement, could obtain redress under
GATT provisions.36  While this Panel Report was never adopted by
35. See United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991 (unadopted), GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991).
36. See id.
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the GATT Contracting Parties, environmentalists remain concerned
that some nations that are not members of particular multilateral en-
vironmental agreements, but are WTO Members, might challenge the
multilateral environmental agreements in the WTO.37
If the climate change agreements comprised trade measures, how
might this concern arise in the context of those agreements?  Those
countries that are WTO Members, but not UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol
Parties, have preserved their GATT/WTO rights, and could seek re-
dress in the WTO in the event the climate change agreements were to
adopt trade measures that, as applied to those UNFCCC/Kyoto Pro-
tocol non-Parties, were inconsistent with the obligations of the WTO.
One or two countries from each region are in this category, including
existing and potentially major fossil fuel producers.38
The foregoing analysis would be relevant if the multilateral
agreements on climate change comprised any trade measures.  But
they do not.  As described more fully below, neither the UNFCCC
nor the Kyoto Protocol in and of themselves comprise any measures
that are inconsistent with the rights and obligations of WTO Mem-
bers.  Consequently, at the present time, the fact that some countries
37. There is a body of treaty law which holds that as amongst themselves, a group of Par-
ties to one treaty can subsequently waive their rights and obligations under that treaty by rati-
fying a later treaty on the same subject that modifies the rights and obligations under the first
treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  Thus, a group of GATT Contracting Parties might subse-
quently ratify a multilateral environmental agreement that effectively modifies their GATT
rights and responsibilities.  Such might be the case with regard to Parties to GATT 1947 that
subsequently ratified the Convention to Regulate International Trade in Endangered Species of
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, T.I.A.S. 8249, 993 U.N.S.T. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975)
[hereinafter CITES] (imposing restrictions on trade in endangered species of animals and
plants); the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) (banning trade in hazardous
wastes between Parties and non-Parties); and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) (ban-
ning trade in ozone-depleting substances between Parties and non-Parties).  On the other hand,
if a country became a GATT Contracting Party or a WTO Member State after it joined a mul-
tilateral environmental agreement, the later-in-time trade agreement might be deemed to mod-
ify the rights and obligations of the environmental agreement.  In the case of the Kyoto Protocol
and the WTO, the WTO Agreements were adopted in 1994, and nations ratified the WTO
agreements in the 1994-96 time period.  The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, and nations
are just now beginning to ratify it.  Thus, if there were any inconsistency between the two, then
as among nations that are parties to both, the Kyoto Protocol could be considered the later-in-
time agreement.  However, a millennium round of WTO negotiations might present an oppor-
tunity for Kyoto Protocol Parties to ratify a later-in-time trade agreement, so if there were any
inconsistency between the two, timing issues would need to be considered carefully.
38. The Appendix also illustrates that some nations are UNFCCC Parties and yet are not,
at press time, WTO Members (e.g., China).
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are members of the climate change agreements but not the WTO
agreements, while others are members of the WTO agreements but
not the climate change agreements, is of no import.
III.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLIMATE CHANGE
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO AGREEMENTS
In the international discussions that have ensued following adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol, a number of negotiators from both indus-
trialized and developing nations have raised questions about the rela-
tionship, if any, between the emissions trading system of the Kyoto
Protocol and the legally binding rules governing international trade.39
The text of the instruments sheds some light on the relationship,
or lack thereof, between the climate change agreements and the
WTO agreements.  On their face, the climate change agreements con-
tain no trade measures; they do not restrict trade in any good or
service.  While the Kyoto Protocol establishes a system of tradable
emissions allowance units, nothing in the Protocol restricts or dis-
criminates against trade in those units.  Moreover, the UNFCCC con-
tains provisions to guide decision-makers in the case of trade-related
disputes arising out of its implementation.  Article 3.5 of the
UNFCCC provides:
In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to
implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by
the following: . . . 5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a
supportive and open international economic system that would lead
to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, par-
ticularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to
address the problems of climate change.  Measures taken to combat
climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on international trade.40
39. For an early examination of the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions trading
and the multilateral trading system of the GATT/WTO, see ROBIN CLARKE, A PILOT
GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING SYSTEM: THE LEGAL ISSUES 11-12 (United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development Pub. No. UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/Misc.2, 1996). See also RICHARD
B. STEWART ET AL., LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY A PILOT INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE
GAS TRADING SYSTEM 39-40 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Pub. No.
UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/Misc.1, 1996), available at <http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/po1leg96.
htm>.
For more recent analyses, see Nick Mabey, Implementing Good Climate Governance: De-
signing the Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms to Support Long-term Climate Protection (1999); see
also Jacob Werksman, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO (June 1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
40. UNFCCC, supra note 6, at art. 3.5.
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A. Of Principles and Property Rights: What Are These Tradable
Things, Anyway?
A first question that must be asked in examining the interface, if
any, between the WTO Agreements and the emissions trading system
of the Kyoto Protocol, is, what in the Kyoto Protocol’s trading system
would be subject to any of the WTO Agreements, including GATT
1947?  Or, stated differently, what is the traded item in the Kyoto
Protocol system, and which WTO Agreement, if any, covers trade in
that item?
As noted above, the Kyoto Protocol establishes a set of sover-
eign responsibilities to limit GHG emissions to specified levels.  It
further establishes a set of GHG emissions allowances for each Party
that has accepted these responsibilities, and it affords parallel oppor-
tunities to create similar, but not identical, allowances by Parties that
have not accepted such responsibilities.  Finally, the Protocol allows
Parties to transact these allowances.
The AAUs allocated to Annex B Parties under the Protocol exist
only because the Protocol has created them.  They cannot be pro-
duced by any other means.  CERs and ERUs can be “produced,” but
are only legally cognizable in the Kyoto Protocol context if produced
under the legal structures established by the Protocol.  All three units
have sovereign characteristics—they are issued by means of agree-
ment among sovereign states, and their sole use is for the purpose of
meeting sovereign obligations under international treaty.  In this re-
spect, they resemble other transactable sovereign obligations.  And in
some respects, they can be considered to represent sovereign debt—
debt to the atmosphere.
B. Which WTO Agreement, If Any, Covers This Trade?
There is no WTO Agreement that explicitly addresses trade in
emissions allowances.  There is no prior dispute panel proceeding that
squarely addresses the question of whether trade in emissions allow-
ances would be subject to WTO disciplines.  Only the WTO Members
have the legal competence to determine, through their established
procedures, whether trade in allowances would be subject to the
WTO Agreements.  Hence, analysis in this area is necessarily specula-
tive.  Nonetheless, a few points can be made.
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The WTO Agreements cover trade in goods (i.e., products);
trade in services; and trade-related aspects of intellectual property.41
WTO Agreements also address a number of considerations related to
trade in goods and services including the following:
• subsidies (WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures);42
• government procurement measures pertaining to products, serv-
ices, and suppliers (WTO Agreement on Government Pro-
curement);43
• investment measures (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Investment Measures (TRIMs));44
• technical barriers to trade in products (WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT));45
• agricultural trade, including not only trade in agricultural prod-
ucts, but also sanitary and phytosanitary measures that Mem-
bers may take to protect their domestic environment from ag-
ricultural pests and diseases (WTO Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS);46 and
• dispute settlement among WTO Members (WTO Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU)).47
Therefore, in order to be covered by any of the WTO Agree-
ments, trade in emissions allowances under the Kyoto Protocol would
have to constitute trade in goods or products, services, intellectual
property, or agriculture; or national measures implementing Kyoto
41. See generally GATT 1947, supra note 24, (covering goods). See also Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, at Annex 1A, WTO Agreement, supra note 23; General
Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS], at Annex 1B, WTO Agreement, supra
note 23; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS], at
Annex 1C, WTO Agreement, supra note 23.
42. See Subsidy Agreement, supra note 34.
43. See Agreement on Government Procurement, at Annex 4B, WTO Agreement, supra
note 23.
44. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Investment Measures [hereinafter
TRIMs], at Annex 1A, WTO Agreement, supra note 23.
45. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter TBT Agreement], at An-
nex 1A, WTO Agreement, supra note 23.  It is this TBT Agreement that would provide the
framework of rules for disputes about whether one nation’s product standards, adopted in im-
plementation of its Kyoto Protocol obligations, impermissibly discriminated against any of its
trading partners. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 3, at 1.
46. See Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter SPS Agreement],
at Annex 1A, WTO Agreement, supra note 23.
47. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[hereinafter DSU], at Annex 2, WTO Agreement, supra note 23.
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Protocol trading would have to constitute trade-related investment
measures or “subsidies” as that term is defined in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
On its face, the Kyoto Protocol does not pertain to agricultural
trade or to trade in intellectual property, so a nexus with the WTO
Agreements in those areas can be ruled out immediately.  Also on its
face, the WTO TRIMs agreement does not cover the Kyoto Protocol.
However, had nations adopted the OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), some of the broad definitions of “investment”
that were considered during the negotiations on that agreement
probably would have covered emissions reduction investments under
the Kyoto Protocol, in particular CERs under the CDM.48  With re-
gard to government procurement and technical barriers to trade, cov-
erage under those agreements depends on whether trade in GHG al-
lowances constitutes trade in products/services.  And of course the
coverage under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding would
only be triggered if another WTO Agreement applies.
Consequently, the next two sections will focus on whether trade
in GHG emissions allowances constitutes trade in goods/products or
trade in services.  A following section will address whether national
implementation of Kyoto Protocol emissions trading could constitute
a subsidy.49  Throughout the analysis, the caveat remains that the dis-
cussion is entirely speculative: only the WTO Members and the bod-
ies established by them, including through the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, have legal competence to provide definitive interpre-
tations of the WTO Agreements.
1. Goods; Products
The WTO itself contains no definition of “product.”  What con-
stitutes a “product” in some respects can be observed from the identi-
fication of products in the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (“Harmonized System”).50  No WTO Agreement ex-
ists that defines tradable emissions allowances as “products” for
WTO purposes, and the Harmonized System has no entry for emis-
sions allowances.  GATT practice indicates that WTO Members are
likely to take a case-by-case approach to the question of whether a
48. For several authors views on the MAI, see First GATT, Then NAFTA, Now MAI?,
ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 46.
49. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
50. See 1 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 106-10
(Amelia Porges ed., 6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX].
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particular item is a “product” for WTO purposes.51  AAUs, ERUs,
and CERs, as well as any allowances issued by sovereign nations for
purposes of domestic implementation of greenhouse gas emissions
limitation obligations, are fundamentally government creations to fa-
cilitate compliance with international obligations.  They exist only in
consequence of, and through, the legally binding commitments of
sovereign nations to limit GHG emissions.  In a common-sense fash-
ion, they differ markedly from “products” as such.
GATT practice offers some support for this type of distinction
between “products” and transactable components of sovereign obli-
gations.  A 1985 GATT Panel Report on “Canada - Measures Af-
fecting the Sale of Gold Coins,” which has not been adopted, found
that when Maple Leaf (Canadian) and Krugerrand (South African)
gold coins were traded as investment goods, they were “like prod-
ucts,” and measures affecting their sale would be subject to GATT
disciplines.  The Panel also noted, however, that insofar as these coins
were utilized as “legal tender,” they were means of payment, rather
than “products.”52  Similarly, to the extent that AAUs, ERUs, and
CERs are a form of “legal tender” or “means of payment” in satisfac-
tion of sovereign obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, they likely
would not be considered “products” under the WTO Agreements.
Further, governments, in their approach to the creation of these
items, are treating them as obligations that are uniquely sovereign in
character.  In that respect, the UNFCCC Parties are contemplating
rules that would treat these items in ways fundamentally different
than the “like product” approach that resides at the core of the WTO
obligations.53  In order to facilitate compliance with their greenhouse
51. See, e.g., 1970 Working Party Report on “Border Tax Adjustment,” L/3464, Dec. 2,
1970, 18S/97, 102, ¶ 18 (“With regard to the interpretation of the term ‘like or similar products’,
which occurs some sixteen times throughout the General Agreement, it was recalled that con-
siderable discussion had taken place. . .but that no further improvement of the term had been
achieved.  The Working Party concluded that problems arising from the interpretation of the
terms should be examined on a case-by-case basis.”), quoted in GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX,
supra note 50, at 155.
52. See Canada - Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, Panel Report, L/5863, ¶ 51
(1985) [hereinafter Gold Coins].
53. See GATT 1947, supra note 24, art. 1.1 (“[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or immu-
nity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”); see also id. at art. 3.4 (“The prod-
ucts of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of na-
tional origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, of-
fering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”).
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gas emissions limitation obligations, it is likely that the UNFCCC Par-
ties will decide to create a registry that will identify all AAUs, ERUs,
and CERs in trade by a unique serial number indicating country of
origin, year of origin, and in the case of ERUs and CERs, project of
origin.54  Such identification is critical for compliance purposes, in or-
der to avoid “double-selling” of the same allowances.  Given this
unique identification system, it is doubtful that AAUs, ERUs, and
CERs would be considered “like products.”
Moreover, while emissions trading is, in some ways, comparable
to trading of other sovereign obligations such as currencies or debt,
neither currency nor debt are created as a consequence of a multilat-
eral treaty obligation.  Rather, both arise primarily as a consequence
of domestic obligations.
A cautionary note needs to be sounded, however.  The una-
dopted Canada Gold Coins Panel Report counsels that if AAUs,
ERUs, and CERs were to be traded as investment goods, they might
be deemed “like products” for WTO purposes.55  That possibility
makes it advisable to examine the types of restrictions on emissions
trading that UNFCCC Parties might impose and the ways in which
they might impose them.
First, the UNFCCC Conference on the Parties (COP) might
adopt restrictions on trading for the express purpose of maintaining
the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions reduc-
tion and trading system.56  For example, the COP might adopt them as
a means of holding parties accountable in the event that their actual
emissions exceed their AAUs.  It is likely such restrictions would be
justified under the Article XX exceptions to GATT 1947.  In contrast,
measures adopted by fewer than all Parties, particularly measures
that unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminate against the AAUs, ERUs,
or CERs of other countries and that place quantitative restrictions on
their trade or use or discriminate against ERUs or CERs based on the
54. See, e.g., Peter Alsop, New Zealand Ministry of Commerce, & Jennifer Macedonia,
United States Environmental Protection Agency, Presentation at the Technical Workshop on
Mechanisms under Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, Bonn, Germany (Apr. 14, 1999),
reported in EARTH NEGOTIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg,
Manitoba, Can.), Apr. 19, 1999, at 12-13, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/
download/asc/enb1298e.txt>.
55. See Gold Coins, supra note 52; see also Werksman, supra note 39, at 9.
56. See, e.g., Anne Petsonk & Chad Carpenter, The Key To The Success Of The Kyoto
Protocol: Integrity, Accountability And Compliance, LINKAGES J. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable
Development, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Can.), May 28, 1999, at 5, 6-7 (discussing restrictions on
trading needed for accountability purposes), available at <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/journal/
petsonkcarpenter.html>.
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way they were produced (e.g., the emissions reduction/sequestration
technology or process), might indeed be subject to recourse under the
WTO Agreements.
The course recently proposed by the EU raises some concerns in
this regard.  The EU proposed to place quantitative restrictions (a
“concrete ceiling”) on trade in AAUs, ERUs, and CERs.  It hinted at
a discriminatory approach to trading of so-called “hot air,” i.e., re-
stricting trade in AAUs of certain Kyoto Protocol Parties whose
AAUs in 1999 or 2000 were greater than their projected actual emis-
sions for 2008-2012.  It is possible that these or similar restrictions
could be adopted by a vote of fewer than all UNFCCC Contracting
Parties.57  In that situation, a UNFCCC Contracting Party that has
objected to the adoption of these discriminatory rules and that is a
Member of the WTO might seek redress via the WTO, possibly in-
voking the unadopted Canada Gold Coins Panel Report in support of
its claim that the UNFCCC had unjustifiably discriminated against
the like product (AAUs, ERUs, CERs) of another WTO Member.
While the considerable overlap between the membership of the WTO
and the UNFCCC membership means that countries that would con-
sider the issue in the WTO would be largely the same as those that
would have voted on the issues in the UNFCCC, the WTO members
would be applying a different body of international law.  Due to this
overlap, the outcome is not entirely clear.
The UNFCCC Parties can reduce the likelihood of friction with
the WTO if they refrain from imposing quantitative restrictions and
discriminatory restrictions on the operation of the emissions trading
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.  Moreover, the Parties can en-
hance the environmental and economic effectiveness of the Protocol
if they refrain from imposing such restrictions.  Just as the WTO pro-
hibition on quantitative restrictions on trade in goods was developed
and agreed upon because such restrictions are not transparent and re-
sult in less than welfare-optimal trade, quantitative restrictions on
trade in emissions allowances can inhibit transparency and environ-
mental protection.  In the case of a quantitative restriction on trade in
allowances, investors will under-invest in emissions reduction activi-
ties since they cannot be certain that the emissions credits or surplus
allowances that such investments generate would be transactable
57. While the lack of agreed upon Rules of Procedure for the COP makes a majority vote
on these kinds of issues less likely, the Kyoto Protocol may be amended by majority vote. See
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 20.
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without running afoul of the quantitative restriction on trade in al-
lowances.
Furthermore, such a system would lack transparency since, at
any point in time it would be impossible to tell which particular emis-
sions reduction investments and transactions might push a country
over its allowance trading ceiling.  This effect will be most pro-
nounced early in the emissions budget period—when, for environ-
mental protection purposes, long-term investments in cleaner tech-
nologies ought to be most encouraged and when early investments
have the potential to yield the best returns on investment and the
smoothest capital stock transition.  Consequently, the under-
investments in emissions reduction activity early in an emissions
budget period will result in less environmental protection early on
and higher compliance costs later.
2. Services
Undoubtedly, many of the means by which Kyoto Protocol Par-
ties and their entities reduce GHG emissions will involve services.
Some of the activities that Parties and their entities undertake in the
course of emissions trading may likely involve services, such as those
of brokers, verification entities, and the like.  At the national level, a
Party’s regulation of those services may raise issues under the GATS;
however, it is not likely that the Kyoto Protocol itself raises such is-
sues.58
Part I of the basic WTO agreement on services defines its scope:
services supplied from the territory of one member to the territory of
another; services supplied in the territory of one member to the con-
sumers of any other (e.g., tourism); services provided through the
presence of service-providing entities of one member in the territory
of any other (e.g., banking); and services provided by nationals of one
member in the territory of any other (e.g., construction projects or
consultants).  Members of the GATS are required to identify the
services to which they wish to apply GATS disciplines.  While mem-
bers have identified a range of services that could be involved in gen-
erating greenhouse gas emissions reductions (e.g., engineering) and
services that could be involved in emissions trading (e.g., account-
58. For a cogent argument that the CDM does constitute a “service,” and that trade in
CERs constitutes trade in services within the meaning of the GATS, see Glenn M. Wiser, The
Clean Development Mechanism v. The World Trade Organization: Can Free-Market Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 531 (1999). See
also Werksman, supra note 39, at 15.
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ants), no member has identified emissions trading in particular as a
service covered by the GATS.59
Moreover, even if a WTO member identified emissions reduc-
tion and emissions trading-related services as services to which it
wished to apply GATS disciplines, that would not mean that the
Kyoto Protocol itself engaged the GATS.  Nothing in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in any way restricts or discriminates against trade in services as-
sociated with GHG emissions reductions or emissions trading.  It is
therefore unlikely that the WTO Members would find that the Kyoto
Protocol itself raised GATS issues.
3. Subsidies
Even if trade in allowances is not trade in products or services,
and therefore is not subject to WTO disciplines, could issues con-
cerning subsidies arise from a Party’s implementation of its Protocol
obligations?  It is possible but not necessarily the case.
Three issues have attracted attention in the subsidies area.  First
is the question of allocation of emissions allowances.  Second is
whether a Party’s failure to enforce its domestic measures could con-
stitute an actionable subsidy.  Third is whether payments under the
Clean Development Mechanism might be considered subsidies.  This
section provides an overview of the WTO Subsidies Agreement and
then analyzes each of these questions in relation to the text of the
Agreement.
a. The WTO Subsidies Agreement
The WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that:
For purposes of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if:
(a)(1)  there is a financial contribution by a government or any
public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this
Agreement as “government”) i.e. where:
(i)  a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g.
grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of
funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); . . .
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.60
The Agreement further provides that only “specific” subsidies—
generally, those available only to an enterprise, or industry, or group
59. See GATS, supra note 41.
60. Subsidy Agreement, supra note 34, at art. 1.1 (emphasis added).
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of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority
granting the subsidy—are subject to the disciplines set out in the
Agreement.61
The agreement establishes three categories of subsidies.  The
first category is “prohibited” subsidies: those contingent, in law or in
fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export
performance; and those contingent, whether solely or as one of sev-
eral other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.62
Prohibited subsidies are subject to new dispute settlement proce-
dures, the main feature of which is an expedited timetable for action
by the Dispute Settlement body, and if it is found that the subsidy is
indeed prohibited, it must be immediately withdrawn.63  If this is not
done within the specified time period, the complaining Member is
authorized to take countermeasures.64
The second category is “actionable” subsidies.65  The Agreement
stipulates that no member should cause, through the use of subsidies,
adverse effects to the interests of other signatories (e.g., injury to the
domestic industry of another signatory), nullification or impairment
of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other signatories under
the General Agreement (in particular the benefits of bound tariff
concessions), or serious prejudice to the interests of another mem-
ber.66  “Serious prejudice” shall be presumed to exist for certain sub-
sidies such as where the total ad valorem subsidization of a product
exceeds five percent.67  In such a situation, the burden of proof is on
the subsidizing member to show that the subsidies in question do not
cause serious prejudice to the complaining member.68  Members af-
fected by actionable subsidies may refer the matter to the Dispute
Settlement body.69  If such adverse effects are determined to exist, the
subsidizing member must withdraw the subsidy or remove the ad-
verse effects.70
The third category includes “non-actionable” subsidies which can
either be non-specific subsidies or specific subsidies involving assis-
61. Id. at arts. 1.2 & 2.
62. Id. at art. 3.
63. See id. at art. 4.7.
64. See id. at art. 4.10.
65. Id. at art. 5.
66. See id. at art. 5.
67. Id. at art. 6.1.
68. See id. at art. 6.2.
69. See id. at art. 7.4.
70. See id. at art. 7.8.
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tance to industrial research and pre-competitive development activity,
assistance to disadvantaged regions, or a certain type of assistance for
adapting existing facilities to new environmental requirements im-
posed by law and/or regulations.71  Where another Member believes
that an otherwise non-actionable subsidy is resulting in serious ad-
verse effects to a domestic industry, it may seek a determination and
recommendation on the matter.72
b. Does the Allocation of Allowances, per se, Constitute an
Actionable Subsidy?
Just as a nation’s decision to limit air and water pollution may in-
volve imposing pollution restrictions on sectors and individual firms, a
nation’s decision to implement a program to limit its GHG emissions
may entail placing restrictions on GHG emissions from specific sec-
tors and entities.  As is the case with all environmental regulations,
each nation retains the sovereign right to allocate the burden of emis-
sion limits in whatever way it chooses, regardless of the form of envi-
ronmental regulation that it selects—e.g., pollution taxes, emission
caps, technology standards, or other means.  Each nation also retains
the sovereign right to allow these forms of obligations to be transfer-
able or not.  Consequently, the decision of any nation to impose a
domestic GHG regulatory system by allocating to firms the obligation
to limit emissions to specified levels, remains the sovereign preroga-
tive of that nation.  Similarly, under the Kyoto Protocol, each Annex
B nation retains full sovereign right to choose how to allocate its
emission limitation burden, including by means of allocating AAUs.
The Protocol does not in any way specify how nations are to allocate
their AAUs.  Moreover, one group of nations has already demon-
strated that it regards the reallocation of each nation’s assigned
amount among the group as fully consistent with both international
treaty law—presumably including the WTO—and with its own inter-
nal group-wide treaties: the EU has announced that it will reallocate
its member states’ individual emissions allowances with the result that
some states will be assigned more than others.73  The following theo-
retical possibilities, among others, may be considered with regard to
national and multinational allocation of assigned amounts.  Each pos-
71. See id. at art. 8.
72. See id. at art. 9.1.
73. See, e.g., EURPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 4.  The EU is acting under Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 4.
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sibility carries with it an implicit set of political, economic, and social
policy choices.
• Allocation based on historic emissions levels.  Under this ap-
proach, also known as “grandfathering,” a nation or group of
nations would distribute some or all of its emissions allowances
for the 2008-2012 period among domestic sources of GHG
emissions in proportion to the historic emissions of those
sources.  This distribution may be further subdivided into “up-
stream” and “downstream” allocations.74
• Auction.  A nation, or group of nations, might auction some or
all of its allowances for the 2008-2012 period to the highest
bidders.  The auction might be held in advance of the commit-
ment period.  Multiple auctions could be held, including auc-
tions during the commitment period.
• Other social, economic, or political policy-based distribution.  A
nation or group of nations might allocate allowances in order
to further particular social policies that the nation or group
considers important.  For example, in one nation, the transport
industry might wield greater political power than the electricity
sector, and the government might choose to allocate more al-
lowances to the transport sector than to others.  In that case,
fewer allowances would be available for the electricity sector.
Another nation might choose to allocate some allowances to
its manufacturing sector and fewer to other sectors.  A third
nation might allocate allowances to households, with fewer al-
lowances available to industry.  A fourth nation might allocate
allowances to persons who maintain healthy lifestyles, to the
national football team, or to some other socially desirable
group.  In a fifth case, a regional group might allocate allow-
ances to nations or sectors whose economic development it
particularly wishes to spur.  And so on.
• Allocation based on early action to reduce emissions.  A nation
or group of nations might choose to allocate allowances to
those companies and communities that move early to reduce
GHG emissions.  Under this type of approach (of which there
are many variants), the nation or group would make a com-
mitment to its emitters about the formula for allocation, based
74. For a useful analysis of the WTO implications of “upstream” versus “downstream” al-
location, see Werksman, supra note 39, at 16-18.
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on the emissions performance of entities prior to the commit-
ment period.
Each of these approaches tends to favor some groups over oth-
ers.  By definition, that is the case when government allocates a scarce
commodity.75  Grandfathering provides allowances to existing sources;
new sources that begin emitting after the distribution is made will
have to purchase allowances in the market.  Auctioning provides al-
lowances to those who can afford to pay; those who cannot simply
will not be able to emit GHGs.  Other social, economic, or political
distributions may favor certain societal, economic, and political pref-
erences, and not others.  Systems that allocate allowances to early re-
ducers may, as a practical matter, require those who do not begin re-
ducing emissions early to purchase allowances or to have fewer
available to them as a result of the pre-commitment period allocation.
One nation might argue that another nation’s decision to allocate
allowances through one or another of these means might constitute a
subsidy.  If two nations used similar systems but the result of the dif-
fering national rules under those systems was a different allocation,
one might argue that the other’s allocation system constituted a sub-
sidy.  Finally, one nation that imposes strict domestic consequences
on entities that fail to meet emissions targets might argue that another
nation’s less stringent domestic compliance system might constitute a
subsidy.  But, in light of the WTO Subsidies Agreement, it is unlikely
that any of these arguments would stand.
It is unlikely that a country’s choices about allocation of its as-
signed allowances would be deemed a subsidy by a WTO Panel.  The
initial question is whether a WTO Panel would deem the allocation of
allowances to be the distribution of “a financial contribution.”  While
some have argued that because firms can sell surplus allowances—i.e.,
allowances not needed to meet regulatory requirements—for cash,76
surplus permits must be deemed a “financial contribution,” this result
is unlikely.
In effect, a decision about allocating an assigned amount of al-
lowances is a decision about allocating national responsibilities to
comply with an international regulatory regime.  Identifying Kyoto
Protocol allocations as subsidies could be tantamount to saying that
75. See Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global
Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 73, 93-94 (1999) (“The
process of assigning property rights has definite distributional consequences because property
rights represent claims on rents.”).
76. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 3, at 2.
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any allocation of any responsibility for regulation—whether domestic
or international—would constitute a subsidy.  By that reasoning, any
country’s sovereign decision to subject some and not all sources of
pollution to a regulatory system would constitute a subsidy, and the
entire national and international framework of environmental regula-
tion would be subject to subsidies challenge.  It is unlikely that a
WTO Panel would be willing to reach such a result.  The same rea-
soning applies with regard to allocations under the treaties governing
the European Union, where concerns about “state aid” have been
voiced.77
Moreover, the transactability of the assigned amount units does
not render them “financial contributions.”  There is a long history of
transactable regulatory permits under many countries’ regulatory sys-
tems.  When companies purchase and sell business units, governments
establish rules that govern the transferability of the pollution permits
issued to those business units, and those permits carry with them a fi-
nancial value.  However, the nature of the financial value varies
greatly, depending on a wide variety of factors, as will be the case
with transactable assigned amount units.  This variability places them
in contrast with direct financial contributions, including specific ex-
emptions from generally applied pollution taxes.
c.  Does State Aid, within the Context of the European Union,
Constitute an Actionable Subsidy?
In the European Union, discussion is proceeding on the question
of environmental policy and state aid—governmental aid toward the
operation of a firm.78  In particular, it is likely that the EU Commis-
sion will raise questions as to whether the allocation of emissions al-
lowances, free of charge, to particular firms, would constitute a bene-
fit in kind that could, in turn, be utilized by the firms for production
of goods, raising questions under applicable European Union law.79
77. See, e.g., CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, STABILITY AND STEADY GROWTH FOR
BRITAIN: PRE-BUDGET REPORT, 1999, Cmnd. 4479, at ¶ 6.42, available at <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm44/4479/cm4479.htm>
78. See Council Announcement 9420/00 of Guidelines on State Aid for the Environment
(June 22, 2000) (not yet published), available at <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?
LANG=1>.
79. The initial view of the Commission was that such allocation could constitute State Aid,
which could be prohibited but for the fact that it concerns the environment. See State Aid: Den-
mark - Commission Approves Tradable CO2 Emission Permits for the Electricity Sector in Den-
mark for the Period 2001-2003, EC COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. (Eur. Comm’n, Brussels,
Belg.), June 2000, at 63 (“[T]he Commission considers that giving producers emission permits
without compensation constitutes State aid on the basis of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.”),
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While the initial view of the Commission is that such allocation
could constitute state aid, it cannot be the case that allocation of al-
lowances free of charge constitutes state aid.  If that were the case,
then allocation of any emissions allowance—such as conventional
permitting, in which the government confers on the emitter the right
to emit up to the permit level but the permit is not fungible—would
also be state aid.  On this view, all environmental regulation would be
state aid, and no environmental regulation other than absolutely uni-
form taxation would be consistent with the EC Treaty.  Moreover,
whether the EU Member States would back the Commission’s analy-
sis is also a matter of doubt, as Member States may not wish to see
national flexibility questions submitted to the approval of the EU
Commission.
An examination of the nature of taxation/levy and emissions al-
lowance trading systems reveals the problem.  Taxation/levy and
emissions allowance trading systems are simply two comparable eco-
nomic instruments for obtaining environmental outcomes.  In taxa-
tion/levy systems, government fixes the Price (P); the Quantity (Q)
that any polluter will emit depends on the marginal cost curve that
the polluter faces, as well as the substitution elasticity for alternative
technologies and products.  All Q has a P—that is, all pollution is
subject to the taxation/levy.  So, in taxation/levy systems, P is known,
and Q is uncertain.80
By contrast, in emissions allowance trading, government fixes Q,
the quantity of allowable pollution, when it sets the cap on total emis-
sions.  The Price (P) will depend on marginal cost curves and substitu-
tion elasticities; and all Q has a P—that is, every firm participating in
the market will have to give a valuation to its quantity of pollution in
order to know whether it makes more economic sense for it to reduce
pollution and sell allowances, or go into the market place and look for
Qs of allowable pollution at market prices (P).  So, in permit trading,
Q is known (which is better for the environment), and P is uncertain.
Under this analysis, allocation of permits free of charge is no
more state aid than taxation/levy is for those emitters whose abate-
available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2000_2_toc.
html>.  See generally Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community
after entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force on May 1, 1999), § 2
(“Aids granted by States”), art. 87.
80. Governments like these systems because they allow governments to get steady streams
of revenue into their treasuries.  The environment bears the uncertainty burden, however, be-
cause a government can never know in advance whether it has fixed P at a level that will achieve
the desired pollution reduction result (Q).
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ment cost is above the tax rate of the emission to be reduced.  When
governments auction emissions permits rather than grandfather them,
they convert permit trading to taxation/levy during the period of the
auction—although Q remains fixed.  During that period, government
takes all the P from the auction for itself, and then government has to
choose how to recycle that revenue into the economy, at which point
government may choose to subsidize some firms and not others.  Un-
der an allocation-free-of-charge system, firms are forced to internalize
P in the context of a market rather than an auction, and the state aid
question is avoided entirely.
What is important, from the perspective of avoiding state aid
questions when  developing taxation/levy and emissions allowance
trading systems, is to ensure that the distribution of the tax/levy bur-
den and the distribution of the emissions allowance trading allocation
is done on a transparent basis.  In that way, the admittedly political
choices that governments make in deciding how to allocate the bur-
dens of emissions taxes and emissions limitations can be known to all,
and EU law applied accordingly.
It should also be recognized that in some circumstances govern-
ments may choose to create systems in which some tax burdens are
distributed unequally, or some emissions allowances are allocated
free of charge while others are auctioned.  In such cases, governments
may be able to minimize state aid considerations if they take care, in
the case of taxation/levy systems, to recycle tax revenues to the enter-
prises upon which the taxation/levy burden falls.  Similarly, govern-
ments may be able to minimize state aid considerations in the case of
tradable emissions allowance systems involving a mixture of free-of-
charge allocation and auction, if governments take care to recycle the
revenues from allowance auctions to the enterprises upon whom the
emissions limitation burdens fall.  Such is the case with the U.S. sulfur
dioxide emissions allowance trading program, in which most of the
emissions allowances were distributed free of charge according to a
set of formulae specified in the statute, while revenues from the auc-
tion of a small number of allowances are distributed to the regulated
entities.
d. Could One Nation’s Persistent Failure to Enforce Its
National Legislation Limiting GHG Emissions Constitute an
Actionable Subsidy?
Nothing in the WTO Subsidies Agreement provides that a na-
tion’s failure to enforce its domestic environmental law constitutes a
subsidy.  However, in the North American Agreement on Environ-
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mental Cooperation (also known as the NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement),81 the Parties to the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA)—Canada, Mexico, and the United States—agreed
that a persistent pattern of failure to enforce national environmental
laws could be an actionable event.82  The NAFTA Environmental
Side Agreement provides specific procedures by which such claims
are made, investigated, evaluated, and acted upon.83  The Agreement
provides for both injunctive relief and compensatory trade remedies.84
This provision would presumably cover climate change legislation in
each of the three NAFTA countries.
In principle, all Kyoto Protocol Parties, or some subgroups, could
agree that a persistent failure by any one of them to enforce law on
GHG emissions might constitute an actionable subsidy or otherwise
actionable event.  (Presumably these Parties could not enforce such a
provision against a non-Party to their enforcement agreement without
running afoul of the unadopted US-Mexico Tuna Dolphin Panel Re-
port discussed above.)85  Such agreements are more likely to be de-
veloped in the context of Article 4 “bubbles,” where any member’s
failure to maintain compliance with its Kyoto Protocol obligations di-
rectly affects the compliance posture of the other members. 86
e. Do Clean Development Mechanism Projects Constitute
Actionable Subsidies?
Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), an Annex B
Kyoto Protocol Party may provide financial payments to a non-
Annex B Party to assist the latter in achieving sustainable develop-
ment and to provide to the former a share of CERs resulting from
emissions reduction projects in the non-Annex B Party’s territory.  It
may be argued that CDM projects themselves may be considered to
81. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of
the United Mexican States, arts. 5, 22, 33, & 45, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) (“With the aim of achieving high levels of environmental protection and
compliance with its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall effectively enforce its
environmental laws . . . .”) [hereinafter NAAEC], available at <http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_
resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=english>; see also PIERRE MARC JOHNSON
& ANDRE’ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND
IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 207-09 (1996).
82. See NAAEC, supra note 81, at arts. 5, 22, 33, & 45.
83. See id. at arts. 14-15, 22-36.
84. See id. at arts. 5, 33-36.
85. See discussion supra Part II.
86. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 4.
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operate as implicit subsidies.  That is, in a non-Annex B nation, par-
ticipation in CDM projects can be used to encourage capital flows in
specific sectors, while the overall emissions in those sectors (and in
the balance of the national economy) remain uncapped.  Moreover,
any certified emissions reduction units from CDM projects may be
transacted by the host country and act as additions to, rather than re-
distributions of, allowable emissions in Annex B nations.  Thus, the
CDM stands in sharp contrast to emissions trading and joint imple-
mentation in Annex B nations, where, as noted above, the allocation
of assigned amount units effectively constitutes a country’s choice
about the domestic distribution of a fixed, internationally agreed
regulatory burden, and the transfer of assigned amount units—
whether through emissions trading under Article 17 or joint
implementation under Article 6—constitutes a bilateral redistribution
of a common regulatory obligation.
Consequently, if a non-Annex B nation were to encourage CDM
investment in one of its industry sectors while allowing the emissions
from that sector to continue to increase, it arguably would confer
upon that sector a financial benefit relative to the operation of that
sector in other Annex B nations.  On that view, the CDM would op-
erate as a subsidy.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the CDM operates in a
manner much more akin to Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) rather than a subsidy.  While a given CDM program or set of
projects might take on more of the characteristics of a prohibited sub-
sidy if the program involved agreements to utilize only emissions re-
duction goods and technologies of the investor or host country, such
agreements are not unusual in the ODA context and have not been
challenged as subsidies.
Even if the CDM were a subsidy, however, the question remains
as to whether it would be an actionable subsidy.  A WTO member
would have to show that it has suffered serious prejudice as a result of
a CDM project in another nation.  A WTO member would have an
easier time making such a showing if the CDM itself, the work of the
Operational Entities, and national CDM programs in host countries
conferred investment preferences or other discriminatory practices
with regard to participation and investment—all of which would
hamper the operation of the CDM in GHG emissions reduction ac-
tivity.  If, on the other hand, the international and domestic institu-
tions are open, available to all UNCCC Parties, transparent, and op-
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erated through competitive bidding processes, the risks of CDM fric-
tion with the Subsidies Agreement will be diminished.
IV.  CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion on the CDM and subsidies and ear-
lier discussions on products, services, and subsidies indicate, the Par-
ties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol reduce the likelihood of
frictions with the WTO system, if they refrain from imposing quanti-
tative limitations on emissions trading and if they avoid placing un-
necessarily discriminatory restrictions on the market mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol.  At the same time, by allowing the mechanisms of
the Kyoto Protocol to operate fully, without unnecessary restraints,
the Parties can allow the Protocol to achieve its greatest potential for
reducing GHG emissions.
Just as the global system of trade in goods and services has de-
veloped a rule-based framework whose basic tenets—transparency,
non-discrimination, and lack of quantitative restrictions on trade—
were developed to maximize the overall societal benefits nations
could gain from trade, analogous rule-based emissions trading
frameworks can guide market forces in favor of environmental
protection.  In that regard, it is possible that well-designed emissions
trading frameworks may be inherently more compatible with the
WTO system of rules than other types of environmental regulatory
frameworks.
While this fact alone would not be sufficient to justify their pref-
erential use, the inherent WTO-compatibility of emissions trading
systems, coupled with their demonstrated ability to achieve environ-
mental improvements faster and at lower cost than other regulatory
alternatives, indicate that nations, companies, and communities, given
the opportunity, may preferentially seek to integrate emissions trad-
ing systems into the global economic marketplace.
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APPENDIX87
Membership in the Climate Change Agreements and the WTO
Country UNFCCC
Party
UNFCCC
Annex I
Kyoto
Protocol
Annex B
WTO
Member
Albania Y N N N
Algeria Y N N N
Angola N N N Y
Antigua and
Barbuda
Y N N Y
Argentina Y N N Y
Armenia Y N N N
Australia Y Y Y Y
Austria Y Y Y Y
Azerbaijan Y N N N
Bahamas Y N N N
Bahrain Y N N Y
Bangladesh Y N N Y
Barbados Y N N Y
Belarus N Y N N
Belgium Y Y Y Y
Belize Y N N Y
Benin Y N N Y
Bhutan Y N N N
Bolivia Y N N Y
Botswana Y N N Y
Brazil Y N N Y
Brunei Darussalam N N N Y
Bulgaria Y Y Y Y
Burkina Faso Y N N Y
87. This Appendix was based on information obtained from the following two websites:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Country Information (last modi-
fied Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/country/index.html> and World Trade Or-
ganization, Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO: The Organization Members
(visited Feb. 1, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm>.
Key:
* — Added to Annex I of the UNFCCC by Decision 4/CP.3 of the Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC, Dec. 11, 1997.
Italic — Member of the WTO Agreements and not the Climate Change Agreements.
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Burundi N N N Y
Byelorussia N N N N
Cambodia Y N N N
Cameroon Y N N Y
Canada Y Y Y Y
Cape Verde Y N N N
Central African
Republic
Y N N Y
Chad Y N N Y
Chile Y N N Y
China Y N N N
Colombia Y N N Y
Comoros Y N N N
Cook Islands Y N N N
Congo N N N Y
Costa Rica Y N N Y
Cote d’Ivoire Y N N Y
Croatia Y Y* Y N
Cuba Y N N Y
Cyprus Y N N Y
Czech Republic Y Y* Y Y
Dem. Rep. of Ko-
rea
Y N N N
Dem. Rep. of the
Congo
Y N N Y
Denmark Y Y Y Y
Djibouti Y N N Y
Dominica Y N N N
Dominican Re-
public
N N N Y
Ecuador Y N N Y
Egypt Y N N Y
El Salvador Y N N Y
Eritrea Y N N N
Estonia Y Y Y N
Ethiopia Y N N N
European Com-
munity
Y Y Y Y
Fiji Y N N Y
Finland Y Y Y Y
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France Y Y Y Y
Gabon Y N N Y
The Gambia Y N N Y
Georgia Y N N N
Germany Y Y Y Y
Ghana Y N N Y
Greece Y Y Y Y
Grenada Y N N Y
Guatemala Y N N Y
Guinea Y N N Y
Guinea Bissau Y N N Y
Guyana Y N N Y
Haiti N N N Y
Honduras Y N N Y
Hungary Y Y Y Y
Iceland Y Y Y Y
India Y N N Y
Indonesia Y N N Y
Ireland Y Y Y Y
Israel Y N N Y
Italy Y Y Y Y
Jamaica Y N N Y
Japan Y Y Y Y
Jordan Y N N N
Kazakhstan Y N N N
Kenya Y N N Y
Kiribati Y N N N
Korea N N N Y
Kuwait Y N N Y
Kyrgyzstan N N N Y
Lao People’s Dem.
Rep.
Y N N N
Latvia Y Y Y Y
Lebanon Y N N N
Lesotho N N N Y
Liechtenstein Y Y* Y Y
Lithuania Y Y Y N
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y
Macedonia N N N
Madagascar N N N Y
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Malawi Y N N Y
Malaysia Y N N Y
Maldives Y N N Y
Mali Y N N Y
Malta Y N N Y
Marshall Islands Y N N N
Mauritania Y N N Y
Mauritius Y N N Y
Mexico Y N N Y
Micronesia Y N N N
Moldova Y N N N
Monaco Y Y* Y N
Mongolia Y N N Y
Morocco Y N N Y
Mozambique Y N N Y
Myanmar Y N N Y
Nambia Y N N Y
Nauru Y N N N
Nepal Y N N N
Netherlands Y Y Y Y
New Zealand Y Y Y Y
Nicaragua Y N N Y
Niger Y N N Y
Nigeria Y N N Y
Niue Y N N N
Norway Y Y Y Y
Oman Y N N N
Pakistan Y N N Y
Panama Y N N Y
Papua New
Guinea
Y N N Y
Paraguay Y N N Y
Peru Y N N Y
Philippines Y N N Y
Poland Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y Y Y
Qatar Y N N Y
Republic of Korea Y N N N
Romania Y Y Y Y
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Russian Federa-
tion
Y Y Y N
Rwanda Y N N N
Saint Kitts and
Nevis
Y N N Y
Saint Lucia Y N N Y
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
N N N Y
Samoa Y N N N
San Marino Y N N N
Saudi Arabia Y N N N
Senegal Y N N Y
Sierra Leone Y N N Y
Singapore Y N N Y
Slovakia Y Y* Y Y
Slovenia Y Y* Y Y
Solomon Islands Y N N Y
South Africa Y N N Y
Spain Y Y Y Y
Sri Lanka Y N N Y
Sudan Y N N N
Suriname Y N N Y
Swaziland N N N Y
Sweden Y Y Y Y
Switzerland Y Y Y Y
Tajikistan Y N N N
Tanzania Y N N Y
Thailand Y N N Y
Togo Y N N Y
Tonga Y N N N
Trinidad and To-
bago
Y N N Y
Tunisia Y N N Y
Turkey N Y N Y
Turkmenistan Y N N N
Uganda Y N N Y
Ukraine Y Y Y N
United Arab
Emirates
Y N N Y
United Kingdom Y Y Y Y
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United States Y Y Y Y
Uruguay Y N N Y
Uzbekistan Y N N N
Vanuatu Y N N N
Venezuela Y N N Y
Vietnam Y N N N
Yemen Y N N N
Yugoslavia Y N N N
Zambia Y N N Y
Zimbabwe Y N N Y
